Government budget deficits in large open economies by Buiter, W. & Sibert, Anne
Government Budget Decits in Large Open
Economies
Willem H. Buiter1 Anne C. Sibert2
Revised 9 May 2011
1Citigroup and CEPR
2Birkbeck, University of London and CEPR. Send correspondence to Prof. Anne Sibert,
Department of Economics, Mathematics and Statistics, Birkbeck, University of London, Malet
Street, London WC1E 7HX, UK; Email: asibert@econ.bbk.ac.uk.
Abstract
Large and growing levels of public debt in the United States, United Kingdom, Japan
and the Euro Area raise new interest in the cross-country e¤ects of a large open econ-
omys decits. We consider a dynamic optimising model with costly tax collection and
exogenously given public spending and initial debt. We ask whether the externalities
associated with an individual countrys decits are positive or negative. We characterise
the path of taxes in the Nash equilibrium where policy makers act nationalistically and
compare this outcome to the global optimal outcome.
JEL classi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1 Introduction
Net general government debt as a share of GDP is expected to be about 129 percent
for Japan, 74 percent for the United Kingdom and 73 percent for the United States in
2011, over twice the levels that prevailed in 2000.1 This burgeoning o¢ cial indebtedness
raises new interest in a topic that has been relatively neglected in recent years: the cross-
country e¤ects of a large countrys borrowing. Does such a countrys borrowing in an
integrated global nancial market impose externalities on other countries? If so are, are
these spillovers exclusively redistributive or do they create or mitigate ine¢ ciency? In this
paper we consider cross-border pecuniary externalities associated with the transmission
of national public debt policies through their e¤ect on the global risk-free real interest
rate.2
We provide a dynamic equilibrium model with optimising households and govern-
ments, in which public debt and the governmentsintertemporal budget constraints pro-
vide a link between current and future tax decisions. Such models are analytically di¢ -
cult, especially if they do not exhibit Ricardian equivalence. Thus, our baseline frame-
work possesses the simplest possible supply side for the national economies: a perishable
endowment. Our model is inhabited by representative innite-lived households with log-
linear preferences and we assume a simple source of Ricardian non-equivalence, or absence
of debt neutrality: increasing and strictly convex real resource costs of administering and
collecting taxes. We require that governments follow sustainable plans and we ignore
monetary policy; hence, we focus on real interest rate cross-border spillovers that oc-
cur in the absence of sovereign default risk and without strategic interactions between a
national scal authority and a national or supranational monetary authority.
We assume that nancial capital is perfectly mobile across countries and that the
international transmission of national scal policy is solely through interest rates. Taxes
1International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2010.
2Pecuniary externalities are externalities that a¤ect another party solely through the prices faced by
the other party.
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are lump sum, but because of the strict convexity of the tax collection costs, the timing
of taxes matters in this model, just as it would with conventional distortionary taxes
on labour income or nancial asset income in models with endogenous labour supply or
capital accumulation.
Without tax collection costs our model, with its representative households, would
exhibit Ricardian equivalence: for any given sequence of public purchases of goods, any
sequence of lump-sum taxes and debt that satises the intertemporal budget constraint
would support the same equilibrium. There would be no international spillovers. This is
true even if countries are large in the world capital market and exploit their monopoly
power. However, with our strictly convex tax collection costs we demonstrate that if
national policy makers cannot cooperate, there are pecuniary externalities that are not
merely redistributive and the outcome is ine¢ cient.
If we had instead assumed overlapping generations, then if there were no tax collection
costs and taxes were lump sum, alternative rules for nancing public purchases of goods
would cause purely redistributive pecuniary externalities. Even with symmetric coun-
tries, there could be distributional e¤ects between generations, but as long as dynamic
ine¢ ciency does not occur, any feasible sequence of lump-sum taxes and debt supports
a Pareto e¢ cient allocation.3
In the one-country special case of our model, tax collection costs do not cause ine¢ -
ciency if one assumes that these costs would be the same in the counterfactual command
economy as they are in our market economy. Ine¢ ciency arises when there are multiple
countries and each country a¤ects other countrieschoice sets through market prices in
a way that is not adequately reected in the market prices.
With symmetric countries and representative, innite-lived households, symmetric
tax policies have no distributional e¤ects. However, because of the convex tax collection
costs, they can have welfare consequences if they change the world interest rate. If
3See Buiter and Kletzer (1991). If there is dynamic ine¢ ciency, then scal policy that causes redis-
tribution from the young to the old can lead to a Pareto improvement.
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countries have outstanding debt and a change in policy causes the interest rate to rise,
then higher debt service means that countries must raise taxes, now or in the future,
and tax collection costs increase. National governments that maximise their own resident
households welfare do not internalise the cost of the higher tax collection costs to other
countries. Thus, if a national governments nancing decision raises the world interest
rate, then it inicts a negative externality on the rest of the world. This is in line with
conventional wisdom.
Where our model departs from conventional wisdom is through the mechanism by
which nancing choices a¤ect interest rates. It is conventional at least in static Key-
nesian models to associate decit nancing of public spending with nancial crowding
out. That is, for a given public spending programme, larger bond-nanced decits
brought about by lower taxes are assumed to raise interest rates.
In our neoclassical intertemporal model this need not be true. Lowering the tax in,
say, period zero and raising it in period one so that the governments intertemporal budget
constraint is otherwise unchanged in periods two and later results in an increased decit
in period zero, a decreased decit in period one and a lower interest rate on borrowing
between periods zero and one. The reason is that lower taxes in period zero and higher
taxes in period one result in lower real resource costs associated with tax collection in
period zero and higher real resource costs in period one. With exogenously given output
this results in higher consumption in period zero and lower consumption in period one.
Thus, the price of consumption in period zero relative to the price of consumption in
period one falls.
We show that if a government is too small to a¤ect the global interest rate, it minimises
the costs of collecting taxes by smoothing them over time. However, if it is able to
inuence the world interest rate and it has strictly positive initial debt, then it sets a
lower tax in the initial period than in future periods. This lowers the interest payment
on the governments outstanding debt and, hence, lowers future tax collection costs.
Relative to the global (cooperative) optimum, noncooperative countries tax too much
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and issue too little debt in the initial period. Reducing current taxes has a positive welfare
spillover, even though it requires issuing more debt. Lowering the current interest rate by
lowering current taxes reduces the cost of servicing all countriesoutstanding debt and
thus reduces all countriesneed for costly tax collection. In a noncooperative equilibrium,
countries do not take into account this benet to other countries and they set taxes too
high in the initial period.
We demonstrate that as the number of countries goes to innity and individual coun-
tries lose their market power, the noncooperative outcome moves further from the optimal
outcome. This result is similar to those obtained by Kehoe (1987) and Chang (1990),
but is in marked contrast to those in typical beggar-thy-neighbour policy games.
Our work is related to the vast literature on other types of international scal policy
linkages. It is also related to the more modest literature on the political economy of the
timing of taxes and to the sizable literature on the optimal timing of multiple distortionary
taxes.
The literature on the international transmission of scal policy has two main strands.
First, there is the work on the transmission of government-expenditure shocks with lump-
sum taxes and without tax collection costs. Examples are Frenkel and Razin (1985,
1987), Buiter (1987, 1989) and Turnovsky (1988); Turnovsky (1997) provides a survey.
The papers in this vein are in contrast to ours in that we take government expenditure as
exogenous and ask how the nancing matters when there are tax collection costs. Second,
there are papers on the transmission of tax shocks in models with distortionary taxes in
a balanced-budget setting. There is a sizable literature going back to Hamada (1966)
 on the strategic taxation of capital income in a world economy. In this literature,
a capital-exporting (importing) country can increase its national income by acting as
a monopolist (monopsonist) and restricting capital movements. The result is a Nash
equilibrium where nations want to tax capital ows. Other papers consider issues of the
feasibility of di¤erent tax regimes in an integrated world economy, tax harmonisation and
tax competition. Examples of such papers are Sinn (1990) and Bovenberg (1994).
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In the political economy literature, excessive public decits and debt in a closed
economy may result from an incumbent governments incentive to signal its competency
prior to an election (Rogo¤and Sibert (1988)), a war-of-attrition game over the allotment
of the costs of scal adjustment (Alesina and Drazen (1991)) or a political partys desire
to tie the hands of a possible successor (Persson and Svensson (1989) and Alesina and
Tabellini (1990)).4 Tabellini (1990) extends this latter strand of the literature to a multi-
country setting and shows that international cooperation may exacerbate the distortion
that generates excessive decits, thus worsening the outcome. In this paper, we abstract
from political economy concerns; at least in the baseline model, governments are able to
commit to policies that maximise national welfare.
Chamley (1981, 1986) pioneered the study of dynamic optimal taxation in a closed
economy with optimising households when the government can borrow or lend. He focuses
on the choice between distortionary capital and labour income taxation and does not
consider tax collection costs of the kind studied here. The optimal policy is to impose
the maximum possible capital levy on the private sectors initial, predetermined capital
and public debt and then to switch permanently to a zero capital income tax rate.5
Incorporating tax collection costs of the kind considered here would render Chamleys
highly uneven time prole of tax receipts suboptimal.
Our paper analysing the welfare economics of international interest rate spillovers from
the tax and borrowing strategies of national governments using a dynamic optimising
equilibrium model is perhaps most closely related to Chang (1990,1997). These papers,
discussed in more detail in Section 3, are primarily concerned with purely redistributive
pecuniary externalities associated with changes in the world real interest rate, however,
while our focus is on e¢ ciency losses caused by pecuniary externalities in a model in which,
by construction, changes in the world rate of interest have no redistributive impact in
equilibrium.
4Drazen (2000) provides a discussion of this literature.
5See also Lucas (1988).
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In Section 2 we present our baseline model where the departure from Ricardian equiv-
alence is driven by tax collection costs, policy makers can commit to future taxes and
there are perishable exogenous endowments and log-linear preferences. In Section 3 we
discuss the properties of the Nash equilibrium of the game between national policy makers
and compare it to the global optimal outcome. In Section 4 we alter the baseline model
by assuming that output is endogenous and the result of the householdslabour-leisure
decisions and that the departure from Ricardian equivalence is a result of distortionary
labour taxes. We demonstrate that the global optimal tax policy is qualitatively similar
to that of the baseline model. In Section 5 we consider a three-period variant of our
baseline model and nd the global optimal outcome when it is not possible to commit to
future tax policy. We demonstrate that it features taxes that rise over time. In Section 6
we consider a production economy with capital accumulation, CES preferences and costly
tax collection. We show that if the world is at a steady state with strictly positive debt,
then a coordinated reduction in current taxes nanced by higher future taxes improves
welfare. Section 7 is the conclusion.
2 The Model
The model comprises N  1 countries, each inhabited by a representative innite-lived
household and a government. Each period, each household receives an endowment of the
single tradable, non-storable consumption good and each government purchases an ex-
ogenous amount of the good. Governments nance their purchases by issuing debt or by
taxing their resident households. We assume that the tax system is costly to administer;
governments use up real resources collecting taxes. All saving is in the form of privately
or publicly issued real bonds. We assume that the endowments and the governments
purchases are constant over time and identical across countries. The householdsprefer-
ences and initial asset holdings and the governmentsinitial debt are also identical across
countries. There is perfect capital mobility, and hence, a common world interest rate.
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2.1 The households
The country-i household, i 2 ZN , has preferences over its consumption path given by
ui =
1X
t=0
t ln cit; (1)
where cit is its period-t consumption and  2 (0; 1) is its discount factor.6 The households
period-t budget constraint is
cit + a
i
t+1 = W    it +Rtait; t 2 Z+; (2)
where ait is the households holdings of real bonds at the start of period t, W > 0 is its
per-period endowment of the good,  it is its period-t tax bill and Rt is (one plus) the
interest rate between periods t  1 and t. The households initial assets, a0, are given.
In addition to satisfying its within-period budget constraint, the household must sat-
isfy the long-run solvency condition that the present discounted value of its assets is not
strictly negative as time goes to innity. The transversality condition associated with its
optimisation problem ensures that the present discounted value of its assets is not strictly
positive. Thus,
lim
t!1
ait+1=t = 0; (3)
where t 
Qt
s=0Rs is (one plus) the interest rate between periods 0 and t.
Equations (2) and (3) imply that the present discounted value of the households
consumption equals the present discounted value of its disposable endowment income
plus its initial assets:
1X
t=0
 
wt    it

=t =
1X
t=0
cit=t; where wt 
8><>: W +R0a0 if t = 0W otherwise. (4)
The household chooses its consumption path to maximise its utility function (1) sub-
6We use the notation ZN  f1; 2; :::; Ng, Z+  f0; 1; :::g and Z++  f1; 2; :::g.
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ject to its intertemporal budget constraint (4). The solution satises the Euler equation
cit+1 = Rt+1c
i
t; t 2 Z+: (5)
Solving the di¤erence equation (5) yields the households period-t consumption as a
function of its initial consumption and the interest rate between periods 0 and t:
cit = 
ttc
i
0=R0; t 2 Z+: (6)
Substituting equation (6) into equation (4) yields the households initial consumption as
a function of its taxes and the interest rates:
ci0 = (1  ) 0
1X
t=0
 
wt    it

=t: (7)
Substituting equation (6) into equation (1) yields the households indirect utility as a
function of initial consumption and the interest rates:
ui = ln ci0 + (1  )
1X
t=1
t ln t: (8)
Here and throughout the paper we ignore constants that do not a¤ect the households
optimisation problem.
2.2 The government
The country-i, i 2 ZN , governments period-t budget constraint is
 it   
 
 it
2
=2 + bit+1 = G+Rtb
i
t; t 2 Z+; (9)
where bit is the governments outstanding debt at the start of period t and G > 0 is its
per-period purchase of the good. The tax collection cost associated with a tax  is  2=2,
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 > 0.7 We allow for negative taxes, or subsidies. In this case the collection cost is the
cost of administering and disbursing the surplus. We discuss the tax collection cost in
more detail in the next subsection.
The governments initial debt, b0, is given and we restrict ourselves to the empirically
relevant case of b0  0. We restrict the models parameters so that satisfying equation
(9) is feasible; the restrictions are detailed later in this section.
In addition to satisfying its within-period budget constraint, the government also
satises
lim
t!1
bit+1=t = 0: (10)
As with the household, this is an implication of the long-run solvency constraint and the
transversality condition associated with the governments optimisation problem.8
Equations (9) and (10) imply that the present discounted value of the governments
purchases, plus its initial debt, equals the present discounted value of its tax stream, net
of collection costs:
1X
t=0
h
 it   
 
 it
2
=2  gt
i
=t = 0; where gt 
8><>: G+R0b0 if t = 0G otherwise. (11)
2.3 Market clearing
Market clearing requires that the sum of the N householdsasset holdings equals the sum
of the N governmentsdebt. Thus,
at = bt; t 2 Z+; (12)
7Barro (1979) pioneered these strictly convex tax collection costs in a closed-economy setting. He
assumed that the government minimises the discounted sum of these costs, rather than maximises the
discounted welfare of households.
8We ignore the important issue of the possibility of sovereign default. There is already a sizable
literature on this subject. See, for example, Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Bulow and Rogo¤ (1989) and
Cole and Kehoe (1995).
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where variables without a superscript denote global averages. By equation (12), w0,
dened in equation (4), is equal to W +R0b0:
Goods market clearing requires that the sum of average household consumption, aver-
age government purchases and average tax collection costs equals the average endowment.
Thus,
ct = W  G  1
N
NX
j=1

 
 jt
2
2
; t 2 Z+: (13)
Equation (13) is, of course, also implied by equations (2), (9) and (12).
Averaging both sides of the Euler equation (6) over the N countries yields
t = 0ct=
 
tc0

; t 2 Z+: (14)
Equations (13) and (14) imply that in equilibrium, the interest rate between periods 0
and t is solely a function of period-0 and period-t taxes.
Lower period-0 taxes nanced by higher period-t taxes lower the interest rate between
periods 0 and t. Before continuing, it is interesting to ask whether the timing of taxes
a¤ects the global risk-free interest rate in the manner that this model predicts. There is
a large body of empirical work attempting to quantify the relationship between govern-
ment budget decits and interest rates. However, the results are mixed, the literature is
problematic and the results are hard to interpret for several reasons.9
First, both taxes and interest rates are endogenous and an apparent relationship
between them may be due to the inuence of other variables. For example, automatic
stabilisers cause tax revenue to be lower and decits to be higher during recessions. At
the same time, an expansionary monetary policy (not considered in this paper) may
temporarily lower real interest rates. Thus, the role of monetary policy over the business
cycle may cause decits and real interest rates to be negatively correlated. Second, while
lowering taxes may lower the global risk-free interest rate, it may also increase sovereign-
default risk premia. This is ruled out in our model because each government is assumed
9See Baldacci and Kumar (2010) for a discussion of the results and problems.
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to satisfy its solvency constraint. If the e¤ect on the national sovereign risk premium is
larger than the e¤ect on the global risk-free interest rate, it will cause tax decreases to
be associated with higher measured market interest rates. Third, if tax cuts in a country
include lower capital taxes, then the countrys marginal product of capital may fall to
equate after-tax returns across countries. This causes lower taxes to be associated with
lower (before-tax) interest rates.
Finally, the model here predicts that lowering taxes in the current period and raising
them next period increases the current decit and lowers the interest rate. However, it
also predicts that lowering current and future taxes by the same amount increases the
current decit and has no e¤ect on the interest rate; lowering the current tax by less than
next periods tax is lowered increases both the current decit and the interest rate. In
empirical studies, it is di¢ cult to control for the publics expectation of future tax policy.
Substituting equation (14) into equations (7) and (8) yields
ci0 = (1  ) c0
1X
t=0
t
 
wit    it

=ct: (15)
ui = ln ci0    ln c0 + (1  )
1X
t=1
t ln ct: (16)
Substituting equation (15) into equation (16) yields
ui = ln
 1X
t=0
t
 
wt    it

=ct
!
+ (1  )
1X
t=0
t ln ct: (17)
Substituting equation (14) into equation (11) yields
Bi 
1X
t=0
tsit = 0; where s
i
t 
h
 it   
 
 it
2
=2  gt
i
=ct: (18)
Substituting equation (13) into equations (17) and (18) would allow both the households
indirect utility and the governments budget constraint to be expressed solely as functions
of the paths of the taxes in the N countries.
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For t > 0, sit in equation (18) is the governments period-t primary budget surplus
(or minus one times the decit, if negative), divided by ct. For t = 0, si0 is the primary
surplus less principal and interest on the outstanding debt divided by c0. As a convenient,
if somewhat inelegant shorthand, we will refer to sit as country is period-t discounted
surplus and we will refer to  it    ( it)2 =2  gt as country is period-t surplus, t 2 Z+.
2.4 Taxes and Revenues
In this subsection we describe some of the properties of the surplus function. We dene
the set of feasible taxes and impose some restrictions on the parameter space. We derive
some results about the discounted surplus functions. Finally, we discuss some of the
empirical results relating to real world tax collection costs.
The surplus curve  t  (=2)  2t  gt looks like a La¤er curve, although its shape is the
result of tax collection costs rather than the distortions associated with non-lump-sum
taxes. It attains a maximum of 1= (2) at  = 1=: Temporarily supposing that they
exist, denote the two taxes that yield a surplus of zero by  t and 
+
t , where 0 < 
 
t <
1= < +t .
10 There is a strictly positive surplus in period-t in country i if and only if
 it 2
 
 t ; 
+
t

.
A set of period-t taxes f itgi2ZN is said to be feasible if they leave consumption in each
country strictly positive. Let  be the least upper bound on the set of feasible taxes in a
symmetric outcome.11 We assume that the surplus maximising tax is feasible, but that
a tax equal to the entire endowment is not. To ensure the existence of an equilibrium
where the solution to the policy makers problem is interior it is simple and su¢ cient 
but not necessary to impose conditions that imply that the government can always run
a surplus and that the government can satisfy its intertemporal budget constraint even
10Clearly  t = (1=)
 
1 p1  2gt

and +t  (1=)
 
1 +
p
1  2gt

, t 2 Z+.
11By equation (13),  p(2=) (W  G).
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if its period-0 tax is zero. Thus,12
1= <  < W; 1= (2) > g0;   1= (1 + ) ; (19)
where   1= (2) G
g0
 2
 2   1 .
In the following proposition we show that, given the taxes of other countries, each
countrys discounted surplus as a function of its own tax has a similar appearance to
its surplus function. However, the tax that maximises the discounted surplus is greater
than the tax that maximises the surplus. Moreover, in a multi-country world, if taxes
are identical across countries and if each countrys tax maximises its discounted surplus,
then each countrys tax is less than the tax that maximises the discounted surplus when
there is only one country.
Proposition 1 Let t 2 Z+, i 2 ZN and suppose that  jt <  ; j 6= i. Then, sit has a
unique maximum  iNt 2
 
1=; +t

and is strictly increasing in  it on [0; 
i
Nt) and strictly
decreasing on
 
 iNt; 
+
t

. Furthermore, if taxes are identical across countries then  Nt <
 1t if N > 1:
Proof. All proofs are in the Appendix.
The intuition for why a country can increase its discounted surplus by increasing
taxes above the tax that maximises its surplus is as follows. Suppose that a country is
maximising its surplus. Then a marginal increase in its tax has no e¤ect on the surplus,
which is insensitive to taxes at that level, but it lowers average consumption and thus
increases the discounted surplus. If there is only one country, then the impact of this
tax increase on average consumption is greater than the impact of an increase in a single
countrys tax in a multi-country world. Thus, the discounted surplus maximising tax
is higher when there is just one country than when there are multiple countries and
countries act symmetrically.
12Proposition 1 and 1= (2) > g0 will ensure that  > 0 and, hence, it is always possible to nd such
a  2 (0; 1) :
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We have modelled the cost of collecting taxes as an administrative tax; we could have
modelled it as a compliance cost. These interpretations are equivalent as in either case
the tax is ultimately borne by the households. Before proceeding to the policy makers
optimisation problem it is reasonable to discuss the empirical evidence on the importance
of such costs.
The OECD (2009) estimates that administrative costs as a percentage of resulting
net tax revenue were 1.53 for Japan, 1.10 for the United Kingdom and .45 for the United
States in 2007. Estimating compliance costs is more di¢ cult and most studies have
focused on a particular component. Sanford et al (1989) estimates the compliance cost as
a share of revenue for UK corporate taxes to be 2.22 percent. Allers (1995) estimates the
compliance cost as a share of revenue for Netherlands corporate taxes to be about four
percent. Slemrod and Venkatesh (2002) estimate the compliance cost as a share of revenue
for medium-size US rms to be 28.0 - 29.6 percent. Pitt and Slemrod (1989) estimate
that in 1982 it cost the average itemising US tax payer $43 dollars to itemise deductions;
Guyton et al (2003) estimate that in 2003 the overall compliance cost of the average US
tax payer was 25.5 hours and $149. Slemrod (1996) estimates overall compliance costs
to be about ten percent of resulting revenue. Slemrod and Sorum (1984) estimate the
total resource cost associated with administration and compliance in the United States
to be seven percent of the resulting revenue: about twice as high as the e¢ ciency cost
associated with tax distortions.13
While there appears to be substantial evidence that tax collection costs are both
absolutely large and large relative to the costs arising from tax distortions, there is little
empirical evidence about the shape of the tax collection function. Nevertheless it seems
reasonable that the cost increases at an increasing rate as attempts to collect increasing
amounts of tax lead to increasing e¤orts to evade or avoid such revenue collection. The
assumption that costs are convex is common in the public nance literature. See, for
13One might add to this tax litigation costs, psychological costs resulting from anger, dissatisfaction
and frustration at the tax system, as well as real resource costs arising from disruptive protests and
economic unrest.
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example, Wilson (1989), Kaplow (1990) and Aragón (2010).
3 Dynamic Optimal Taxation
We assume that in period 0 the government in country i can commit to a tax plan
f itg1t=0 : It takes the tax plans of the other governments as given and chooses feasible
taxes to maximise the indirect utility of its household (equation (17)) subject to its
budget constraint (equation (18)), where average global consumption is given by (13).
We consider Nash outcomes where countries act symmetrically.
We rst show that subsidies cannot be part of a symmetric Nash equilibrium and that
taxes must be no greater than the ones that maximise the discounted surpluses.
Proposition 2 A symmetric Nash equilibrium must have  t 2 [0;  Nt] ; t 2 Z+:
The intuition is straightforward. If a country were to choose a tax that is greater than
the one that maximises the discounted surplus, then by Proposition 1, this tax is on the
"wrong" side of the countrys discounted surplus La¤er curve. Thus, there is a tax on the
"right" side of this La¤er curve that yields the same discounted surplus and produces a
smaller distortion. If a country were to provide a subsidy in some period, then it must
impose a tax in some other period. If the country were to lower the subsidy it would
both increase consumption in that period and improve the scal situation, allowing taxes
to be lowered in other periods.
We next show that a unique equilibrium exists and we describe the time path of
equilibrium taxes.
Proposition 3 There exists a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium and it has constant
taxes from period 1 on. Furthermore, if initial government debt is strictly positive, equi-
librium taxes are lower in period 0 than in period 1. If there is no initial government
debt, taxes are constant over time.
The intuition behind the result is that the government trades o¤ two objectives. First,
it wants to smooth consumption by smoothing tax collection costs over time. If this were
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its sole objective, optimality would require constant taxes. Second, however, it wants to
lower the discounted value of the tax collection costs through its inuence on the global
interest rate. It does this by lowering initial taxes and raising future taxes. Through
the goods market clearing condition (equation (13)) this raises initial consumption and
lowers future consumption. By the Euler equation (14) this lowers the interest rate
between periods 0 and 1. Thus its required tax revenue falls and so do its tax collection
costs.
Proposition 4 If countries have no market power (N !1) then taxes are constant
across periods.
When countries have no market power, we have Barros (1979) result. If these costs
are convex, then an optimising government smooths them over time.
We now compare the equilibrium and optimal outcomes and show how the number
of countries a¤ects the deviation of the equilibrium outcome from the global optimal
outcome. We note that the outcome when N = 1 is the global optimal outcome.
Proposition 5 Suppose that N > 1. If there is strictly positive initial government debt,
then the period 0 tax is too high relative to the global optimal tax and subsequent taxes are
too low. Furthermore, increasing the number of countries increases the di¤erence between
equilibrium taxes and global optimal taxes.
The intuition for the rst part of the proposition is that with strictly positive initial
debt, lowering the period-0 tax below subsequent taxes causes a positive externality by
decreasing all countriesborrowing costs. Countries do not take into account this social
benet and they do not lower period-0 taxes enough. The intuition for the second part
of the proposition is that as the number of countries increases and the e¤ect of any one
country on global variables declines, the failure of countries to take into account the e¤ect
of their actions on the world economy becomes more severe.
Our paper can be contrasted to those of Chang (1990,1997), who also models gov-
ernment debt as a dynamic game between national governments. In his overlapping-
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generations framework two-period-lived households produce output when young and con-
sume when old. As no household consumes in more than one period, the Euler equation
of our paper which results in the real interest rate playing the role of the price of
consumption today relative to consumption tomorrow is replaced by a static e¢ ciency
condition that output, and equivalently saving, is increasing in the real interest rate.
Thus an increase in the decit requires an increase in the real interest rate to increase
saving and restore equilibrium.
Unlike in our model, a higher real interest rate (brought about by lower taxes, rather
than by higher taxes as in our model), does not inict a real resource cost on the rest
of the world. Because taxes are lump sum and there are no tax collection costs, the
pecuniary externality in Changs model associated with the e¤ect of a countrys tax
policy on the global real interest rate is purely redistributive. Even though all feasible
national tax policies in Changs model support equilibria that are both dynamically and
Pareto e¢ cient, they are welfare ranked by the nationalistic governments who maximise
a discounted sum of the welfares of current and future generations of residents. The
non-cooperative equilibria have larger government decits and higher interest rates than
the cooperative equilibria.
Our result that the equilibrium outcome is furthest from the global optimal outcome
when the number of countries goes to innity and countries lose their market power is
similar to Changs (1990) result that the non-cooperative solution is furthest from the
cooperative solution when the number of countries go to innity and is in stark contrast to
the result in beggar-thy-neighbourpolicy games where nations attempt to exploit their
market power to gain at the expense of other countries. In such papers, as the number
of countries goes to innity and nations lose their market power, the noncooperative
outcome converges to the cooperative outcome.14
14This would occur for, for example, in Hamada (1966).
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4 Conventional Tax Distortions
In the previous section we considered a scenario where the departure from Ricardian
equivalence is due to tax collection costs. We chose this framework as our baseline both
for its relative tractability and because we believe that tax collection costs are empirically
more important than the e¢ ciency and welfare costs associated with conventional tax
distortions. However, as it is more conventional in the economics literature to focus on
the latter friction, in this section we consider a one-country model where the departure
from Ricardian equivalence is caused by distortionary taxes rather than by tax collection
costs.
4.1 The model with tax distortions
We assume that the household is endowed with one unit of time which it allocates between
labour and leisure. It can produce output one-for-one from labour and it pays a propor-
tional labour-income tax  t on its output. Its saving is in the form of real interest-bearing
bonds.
In each period t 2 Z+ the household receives utility from its consumption of the good
and of leisure, 1  lt:
u =
1X
t=0
t [ ln ct + (1  ) ln (1  lt)] ;  2 (0; 1) : (20)
It maximises equation (20) subject to the within-period budget constraints
ct + at+1 = (1   t) lt +Rtat; t 2 Z+ (21)
and the terminal condition (3), taking a0 as given.
Necessary and su¢ cient conditions for optimality are equations (3) and (21), the static
optimality condition
1  lt = (1  ) ct
 (1   t) (22)
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and the (one-country) Euler equation (14).
The government satises the within-period budget constraint
 tlt + bt+1 = G+Rtbt; t 2 Z+ (23)
and the terminal condition (10), taking b0 as given. Solving equation (23) forward and
substituting (10) into the result yields the governments intertemporal budget constraint
1X
t=0
( tlt   gt) =t = 0: (24)
Substituting equation (22) into equation (24) and equation (14) into the result yields
1X
t=0
 t   gt
t
  (1  ) c0
R0
1X
t=0
t t
1   t = 0: (25)
Market clearing requires that the bond markets clear (equation (12)) and that goods
markets clear
ct +G = lt; t 2 Z+: (26)
Substituting equation (22) into equation (26) and equation (14) into the result yields
c0t =
R0 (1 G)
tht
; t 2 Z+; where ht  1   t
1   t : (27)
This implies
t =
R0h0
tht
; t 2 Z+: (28)
As in the previous section, a decrease in the period-0 tax nanced by an increase in the
period-t tax lowers the interest rate between periods 0 and t.
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4.2 Optimal Taxes
Substituting equation (22) into equation (20) and using equations (14) and (27) yields
u =
1X
t=0
t [ ln (1   t)  ln (1   t)] : (29)
Substituting equations (27) into equation (25) yields
B   (1  )
1X
t=0
t t  G  (1  )R0h0b0 = 0: (30)
As in Section 3, the policy maker chooses the path of taxes to maximise indirect utility
(29) subject to the budget constraint (30). As in Section 2, we need to make assumptions
that ensure an interior optimum exists. We assume that
G < ; R0b0  min f (1  ) = (1  ) ;   G; ( G) =g : (31)
These inequalities are convenient and su¢ cient to ensure that it is possible to satisfy the
governments intertemporal budget constraint with both a constant tax and  0 = 0.
We demonstrate that there is a unique solution to the policy makers problem and we
describe the time path of the optimal taxes.
Proposition 6 There exists a unique optimum and it has the property that  t =  1 >  0;
t 2 Z++:
As in the previous section, global optimality has lower taxes initially and higher taxes
later on.
It appears to be impossible (at least to us) to analyse the Nash equilibrium for the
case of N > 1 analytically. However, it is easy to show that if N ! 1, then the Nash
equilibrium has constant taxes. With no market power, the sole goal of policy makers is
to smooth distortions over time. Hence, countries without market power set the period-0
tax too high and the subsequent taxes too low, relative to the global optimum.
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5 Time Consistent Taxes
The results in Sections 3 and 4 depend on the assumption that the government can
commit to a path of planned taxes. Proposition 3 says that the period-0 tax is lower
than subsequent taxes. This implies that the government enters period 1 with strictly
positive debt. Thus, if the government could re-optimise in period 1, Proposition 3 would
imply that it would set a lower tax in period 1 than in later periods. This implies that the
equilibrium, which features constant taxes from period 1 on, is not time consistent unless
there is no initial debt or countries have no market power. In this section we consider a
three-period variant of the baseline model and nd the time-consistent taxes for the case
of a single country.
The households lifetime utility is given by ln c0 +  ln c1 + 
2 ln c2: The households
budget constraint is given by equation (2) for t = 0; 1; 2, where a3 = 0 and a0 is given.
Optimality for the household requires that the Euler equation (5) hold for t = 0; 1. The
government budget constraints are given by (9) for t = 0; 1; 2, where b3 = 0 and b0 is
given. Market clearing requires that equation (12) holds for t = 0; 1; 2: Consumption is
given by the goods market clearing condition (13) for t = 0; 1; 2:
To nd the time-consistent solution we work backwards, rst maximising utility start-
ing in period 1 and taking R1b1 as given. This gives  1 and  2, as well as maximised
utility from period 1 on as functions of R1b1. In period 1, the government takes R0b0 and
the functional forms of  1,  2 and maximised utility from period 1 on as given. Using
the Euler equation between period 0 and period 1, we can nd R1b1 as a function of  0
and b1. Thus, maximised utility from period 1 on can be expressed as a function solely
of the  0 and b1. The policy maker then chooses  0 and b1 to maximise lifetime utility
subject to the period-0 budget constraint. Leaving the technical details for the appendix,
we have the following result.
Proposition 7 If there is strictly positive initial debt, then time-consistent taxes are
strictly increasing over time.
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This section demonstrates that the result from the baseline model that global optimal
taxes are constant from period 1 on depends on the policymakers ability to commit
to planned future taxes. However, the base-line models result that global optimal taxes
should be relatively low in period-1 and higher thereafter does not depend upon an ability
to commit.
6 Production and Capital Accumulation
An important simplifying feature of the baseline model is that varying the timing of taxes,
and thus tax collection costs, over time is the only way to transfer real resources across
periods. In equilibrium, net global private and public saving is always zero because the
good is perishable. Reducing taxes in any given period increases the resources available
that period and increases private consumption. In this section, we allow for production
using capital as an input. Thus, real resources can be transferred across periods not only
by changing the path of taxes, but also by capital formation.
In this section we assume that there are N countries. We assume that the household
in country i 2 ZN has CES preferences
ui =
1
1  
1X
t=0
t
h 
cit
1    1i ; 0 <  < 1; 0 <  6= 1; (32)
where  is the reciprocal of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. As  ! 1, the
above preferences become the logarithmic specication of Section 2.
The single good in the model is both a capital and a consumption good. The rep-
resentative households each supply one unit of labour inelastically each period and save
both bonds and the output of the current good in the form of capital. The saved capital
is loaned to the rms to be used in the next-periods production process. The rms
transform capital and labour into output via a Cobb-Douglas production function where
output per unit of labour is f(k) = Ak, where k is the capital-labour ratio, A > 0
and  2 (0; 1). We suppose that labour is immobile across countries, capital is perfectly
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mobile and capital depreciates completely. Then perfect mobility of capital and perfect
competition imply that capital-labour ratios and wages are equalised across countries and
kt = k (Rt) = [A (1  ) =Rt]1=.
The Euler equation of the households optimisation problem becomes
cit+1 = (Rt+1)
1= cit; t 2 Z+: (33)
Solving the di¤erence equation (33) and averaging across countries yields
t =
 
1=t

(ct=c0)
 ; t 2 Z++: (34)
The governments budget constraint is given by equation (11). Substituting equation
(34) into equation (11) yields
1X
t=0
tc1 t s
i
t = 0: (35)
Market clearing requires (12) and
f (k (Rt)) G  (=2)
NX
i=1
 
 it
2   ct   kt+1 = 0: (36)
The model with capital is far more di¢ cult to analyse than the one without. To
obtain an analytical result, we restrict ourselves to a simple experiment.
Proposition 8 Suppose countries are at a symmetric steady state with constant taxes
and strictly positive public debt. Then it is possible to increase welfare with a coordinated
marginal tax cut in the current period.
The proof demonstrates that welfare can be improved with a current tax cut (and
associated current consumption increase) nanced by a constant permanent future tax
rise that reduces future consumption by a constant amount.
Lowering the current tax and raising future taxes raises current consumption and
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lowers future consumption, thus lowering the current interest rate as in the previous
sections. This lowers the cost of servicing the debt and reduces future tax collection
costs. To see that the interest rate must fall, suppose that it did not. Then next periods
marginal product of capital rises and current capital accumulation falls. With lower tax
collection costs and xed current output, this implies current consumption rises. This
is inconsistent with the interest rate falling in the current period unless next periods,
and hence every future periods, consumption rises by more than current consumption.
However, with lower current capital accumulation and higher future tax collection costs
this is impossible.
7 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that, in our baseline model with costly tax collection, optimising
governments will perfectly smooth taxes if they have no market power or no initial debt.
If countries are large enough to a¤ect the world interest rate and they have strictly
positive initial debt, then optimising national governments will set lower taxes in the
current period than in the future. We show that, relative to the global optimal outcome,
non-cooperative national governments set current taxes too high and future taxes too
low. Thus, relative to the optimum, initial budget decits are too low and future decits
are too high.
We extend our baseline model to consider a departure from Ricardian equivalence
caused by distortionary labour taxes and show that the optimal outcome is similar to
that in the baseline model: the period-0 tax is lower than the taxes from period 1 on.
We consider a three-period model where commitment to future taxes is not possible and
demonstrate that the cooperative time-consistent taxes are rising over time. Finally, we
consider a model with CES preferences and capital accumulation. We demonstrate that
if the world is in a steady state with strictly positive government debt, then welfare can
be increased with a current tax cut nanced by higher future taxes.
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8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. By (13) and the denition of sit in (18)
@sit=@
i
t =
 
1   it +  itsit=N

=ct: (37)
We have that @sit=@
i
t is continuous in 
i
t on

0; +t

with @sit=@
i
t =
 
1  +t

=ct < 0
at  it = 
+
t and@s
i
t=@
i
t = s
i
t= (Nct) > 0 at 
i
t = 1=. Thus, s
i
t has a critical point 
i
Nt in 
1=; +t

. If  it 2

0; +t

then @sit=@
i
t = 0) @2sit=@ i2t =   (1  sit=N) =ct =   (ct it) 1
< 0. Thus,  iNt is the unique maximiser of s
i
t in

0; +t

and @sit=@
i
t > 0 if 
i
t 2 [0;  iNt)
and @sit=@
i
t < 0 if 
i
t 2
 
 iNt; 
+
t

. As sit < 0 if 
i
t =2

0; +t

,  iNt is the unique maximiser
on (  ; ).
By (13), (37), the denition of sit and the denitions of  , wt and gt (from (4) (with
a0 = b0), (11) and footnote 11), @sit=@
i
t = 0 when 
i
t =  t; i 2 ZN ; implies  2   2wt t +
 2t = 2 tstct (N   1) =N . The left-hand side of this equation is strictly decreasing on 
1=; +t

. When N = 1 the right-hand side is zero and when N > 1 the right-hand side
is strictly positive for  t 2
 
1=; +t

. Hence,  Nt < 

1t:
Note that  Nt = 

N1, t 2 Z++ and  1t = wt  
p
w2t    2:
Proof of Proposition 2. We rst show that no symmetric optimum can have taxes
greater than  Nt: Suppose to the contrary that there exists a symmetric equilibrium
where 9t such that  t = W >  Nt. The continuity of sit in  it on the set of feasible
taxes ensures that there exists a feasible R <  Nt such that s
i
t at 
R equals sit at 
W :
Thus, by (18), a switch from  it = 
W to  it = 
R does not require a change in any other
tax. The government prefers  it = 
R to  it = 
W if its indirect utility (17) is greater at
 it = 
R than at  it = 
W . Let ct evaluated at  it = 
K be denoted by cKt ; K = W;R:
Then this is the case if cRt > c
W
t and
 
wt   R

=cRt >
 
wt   W

=cWt : The rst inequality
is clearly true: By the denitions of wt and gt and sit, the second inequality is true i¤h
W  G  (=2)  R2   cRt sti =cRt > hW  G  (=2)  W 2   cWt sti =cWt . By (13) and
the denition of  this is follows from (N   1)  2 >Pj 6=i ( j)2.
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We now show that taxes cannot be negative. Suppose to the contrary that 9u such
that u < 0. Then, to satisfy (18), 9v such that  v > 0 and sv > 0. We demonstrate
that a marginal decrease in  v accompanied by a marginal increase in u so that (18) is
satised increases indirect utility (17). By  iv 2 [0;  Nv] and Proposition 1, @siv=@ iv > 0;
hence, by (17) and (18) it is su¢ cient to show that
v
 
@siv=@
i
v
  
@ui=@ iu

> u
 
@siu=@
i
u
  
@ui=@ iv

: (38)
Di¤erentiating (17), using (13), yields
@ui=@ it =
 
@H i=@ it

=H i   t (1  ) t=Nct; t 2 Z+; (39)
where H i P1t=0 t (wt    it) =ct. By (13), we have
@H i=@ it =  t

Nct    t
 
wt    it

=
 
Nc2t

; t 2 Z+: (40)
By (13) and the denition of sit, at a symmetric outcome (wt    t) =ct = (ct   ctst) =ct =
1  st. Thus, H = 1= (1  ) and at a symmetric outcome
@ui=@ it =  t (1  ) (N +  tst) = (Nct) ; t 2 Z+: (41)
Using (37) (at a symmetric outcome) and (41), we have that (38) is true if (N + usu) =u
< (N +  vsv) = v. As the left-hand side of this inequality is strictly negative and the
right-hand side is strictly positive, it must be true.
Proof of Proposition 3. We rst nd the remaining relevant derivatives for the opti-
misation problem. By (40), at a symmetric outcome
@2H i
@ ( it)
2 =
t
N2
Nct (1  st)  2 tAt
c2t
;
@2H i
@ it
i
s
= 0; s 6= t; s; t 2 Z+; (42)
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where At  N +  tst    t: Hence, by (39), at a symmetric outcome
@2ui
@ i2t
=  
t (1  )
N2c2t

Dt + 
t (1  )A2t

;
@2ui
@ it
i
s
=  (1  )
2 t+sAtAs
N2ctcs
; s 6= t; t 2 Z+;
(43)
where Dt   (Nctst + 2 tAt +  2t ). By (18) and (37), at a symmetric outcome
@Bi
@ it
=
tCt
Nct
;
@2Bi
@ ( it)
2 = 
t
Nct (st  N) + 2 tCt
N2c2t
;
@2Bi
@ it@
i
s
= 0; s 6= t; t 2 Z+; (44)
where Ct  N +  tst  N t:
The Lagrangian for the governments optimisation problem is Li = ui + iBi; where
i is the multiplier. The rst-order conditions @ui=@ it + 
i@Bi=@ it = 0 imply
@ui
@ it
@Bi
@ i0
=
@Bi
@ it
@ui
@ i0
; t 2 Z++: (45)
Subtituting in the rst derivatives from (41) and (44) into (45) and evaluating at a
symmetric outcome yields
N +  tst
 t
=
N +  0s0
 0
; t 2 Z++: (46)
By (13) and the denitions of wt, gt and sit we can write ct = ct () = wt  gt   2=2
and st = st () = (    2=2  gt) =c () ; t 2 Z+:
Lemma 1. The function t ()  [N + st ()] = is strictly decreasing on (0;  Nt) :
Proof of Lemma 1. Di¤erentiating yields that this is true i¤ t ()   2[1    +
st ()] - Nct () < 0. As t is decreasing in N it is su¢ cient to show this for N = 1.
By the denition of  , this is the case if  t ()   4   4wt 3 + 4 2 2    4 < 0: We have
 t (0) < 0 and  (

1t) < 0; hence, to show  < 0 on [0; 

Nt]  [0;  1t], it is su¢ cient
to show that  t has no interior maximum on [0; 

1t] : Solving @ t=@ = 0 and requiring
@2 t=@
2 < 0 yields  =

3wt  
p
9w2t   8 2

=2 >  1t; hence no interior maximum
exists. 
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By Lemma 1, given  0, a  t that solves (46) is unique; hence,  t =  1; t 2 Z++:
Second-order conditions require the quadratic form
P1
t=0
P1
s=0 (@
2Li=@ it@
i
s) d
i
td
i
s
to be negative where
P1
t=0 (@B
i=@ it) d
i
t = 0, evaluated at a symmetric solution to the
rst-order conditions, except at d it = 0; t 2 Z+: Using (43), (44) and i =   (@ui=@ it) =
(@Bi=@ it), this is true if
1X
t=0
0@t (1  )Dt
N2c2t
+
@ui
@ it
@Bi
@ it
@2Bi
@ ( it)
2
1A d it2 +
 
1  
N
1X
t=0
tAt
ct
d it
!2
> 0: (47)
Using @Bi=@ it > 0, by Proposition 1, this is true if 
t (1  )Dt@Bi=@ it +N2c2t (@ui=@ it)
@2Bi=@ ( it)
2  0: Using (41) and (44) we have that this is true if N3ct N 2t  2 3t st+
N2 3t > 0. This is true because the left-hand side of this inequality is strictly increasing
for N > 1 and, by  ( t) < 0 (in the proof of Lemma 1), it is positive at N = 1.
Finally, we demonstrate that a unique interior equilibrium ( 0;  1) exists and has
 0 <  1. By (18) and (46) such an equilibrium satises
(1  ) s0 ( 0) + s1 ( 1) = 0 (48)
1 ( 1) = 0 ( 0) (49)
By assumption (19) and Proposition 1, 9!^ such that (^ ; ^) and satises (48). For any
 0 2 (0; ^) ; assumption (19) and Proposition 1 ensure that 9! 1 2 (^ ;  0) such that
( 0;  1) satises (48). The conditions of the implicit function theorem are satised on
(0; ^)(0;  0); hence, there exists a unique continuous function A ( 0) on (0; ^) such that 
 0; 
A ( 0)

satises (48). Proposition 1 ensures that @A=@ 0 < 0. The function A is
depicted in Figure 1 by the curve labelled A. Note that 0 () = 1 ()  R0b0=c () <
1 () if  2 (0;  0). By Lemma 1, if  1 2 (0;  0) then 1 ( 1) 2 (1 ( 0) ;1). Also by
Lemma 1, @0=@ 0 < 0 on (0;  0) with 0  !1 as  0 & 0 and 0  ! 0 ( 0) < 1 ( 0)
as  0 %  0. Thus, for any  1 2 (0;  0) ; 9! 0 2 (0;  1) such that ( 0;  1) satises (49).
By the implicit function theorem, there exists a unique continuous function B ( 1) on
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(0;  0) such that
 
B ( 1) ;  1

satises (49). Clearly B (0) = 0 and Lemma 1 ensures that
@B=@ 1 > 0. The function B is depicted in Figure 1 by the curve labelled B. From
Figure 1, it clear that A and B have a unique intersection and that at the intersection
 0 <  1: As st is strictly increasing and t is strictly decreasing on [0;  1t], t = 0; 1, (and
thus any "continuation" of curve A would slope down and any "continuation" of curve
B would slope up) there can be no other equilibria. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 4. This follows trivially from (46).
Proof of Proposition 5. By (49),  1 >  0 and Lemma 1 of Proposition 3, an increase
in N rotates curve B in Figure 1 clockwise. This yields the result.
Proof of Proposition 6. Let  t 2 [0; 1), t 2 Z+: Di¤erentiating (29) and (30) yields
@u
@ t
=   
t (1  )  t
(1   t) (1   t) < 0; t 2 Z+
@B
@ 0
= (1  )

1  
(1   0)2

;
@B
@ t
= t (1  ); t 2 Z++
@2u
@ 2t
=   
t (1   2t )
(1   t)2 (1   t)2
< 0;
@2u
@ t@ s
= 0; s 6= t; s; t 2 Z+ (50)
@2B
@ 20
=  2 (1  )
(1   0)3
< 0;
@2B
@ 2t
=
@2B
@ t@ s
= 0; s 6= t; t 2 Z++; s 2 Z+;
where   (1  )R0b0=:
As all of the cross-partial derivatives are zero, the second-order conditions are satised
if (@B=@ t) (@2u=@ 2t ) - (@u=@ t) (@
2B=@ 2t ) < 0, t 2 Z+. By (50) and @B=@ t > 0, which
follows from an argument similar to that in Proposition 2, this is clearly true.
The rst-order conditions are (30) and 	t ( t) = 	0 ( 0) ; t 2 Z++; where 	t ( t) 
(@u=@ t) = (@B=@ t) ; t 2 Z+: As 	t is strictly decreasing and 	t ( t) = 	1 ( 1), t 2 Z++;
it must be that  t =  1, t 2 Z++ and
	1 ( 1) = 	0 ( 0) ; t 2 Z++: (51)
As in Proposition 3, (31) and (50) ensure that there exists a unique continuous strictly
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decreasing function A ( 0) on (0; ^) such that
 
 0; 
A ( 0)

satises (30) (when  t =  1;
t 2 Z++), where ^ is the unique constant tax that satises (30). By (50) 	0 () < 	1 ()
when R0b0 > 0 if  2 (0;  0). By (50), if  1 2 (0;  0) then 1 ( 1) 2 (1 ( 0) ; 0). Also
by (50), @0=@ 0 < 0 on (0;  0) with 0  ! 0 as  0 & 0 and 0  ! 0 ( 0) < 1 ( 0)
as  0 %  0. Thus, for any  1 2 (0;  0) ; 9! 0 2 (0;  1) such that ( 0;  1) satises (51).
By the implicit function theorem, there exists a unique continuous function B ( 1) on
(0;  0) such that
 
B ( 1) ;  1

satises (51). Clearly B (0) = 0 and (50) ensures that
@=@ 1 > 0. The geometric argument of Proposition 3, using Figure 1 holds and there
exists a unique solution to the optimisation problem and it has  1 >  0:
Proof of Proposition 7. Working backward, in period 1 the governments Lagrangian
is u1+  (sc1 + s2) ; where u1  ln c1+  ln c2; consumption is given by (13), saving is as
dened in (18) and sc1  s1  R1b1=c1:
The Euler equation is given by (5) for t = 1. Optimality requires
1 +  1s
c
1
 1
  1 +  2s2
 2
= 0 (52)
sc1 + s2 = 0 (53)
L11 L12
@sc1
@1
L12 L22
@s2
@2
@sc1
@1
@s2
@2
0

> 0: (54)
Solving (54) implies
  (1 + )@s
c
1
@ 1
@s2
@ 2
  
 21
@s2
@ 2
  1
 22
@sc1
@ 1
< 0: (55)
Di¤erentiating (52) and (53) yields
d 1
d (R1b1)
=
1
c1

(1 + )
@s2
@ 2
  1
 22

;
d 2
d (R1b1)
=   1
c1 21
: (56)
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Di¤erentiating the indirect utility function u1 = u1 (R1b1), using (56) yields
du1
d (R1b1)
=   1
c21

@sc1
@ 1
 1
: (57)
Di¤erentiating (5) at t = 0 yields
@ (R1b1)
@ 0
=
b1c1
c0
 0
 1
d1
d(R1b1)
b1 + c0
;
@ (R1b1)
@b1
=
c1
 1
d1
d(R1b1)
b1 + c0
: (58)
In period 0 the policy maker maximises ln c0+ u1 (R1b1) subject to (13) and (18) at
t = 0. Optimality requires
 0
c0
= 
du1
d (R1b1)

@ (R1b1)
@ 0
  (1   0) @ (R1b1)
@b1

: (59)
Substituting in (57) and (58) into (59) yields
  1

s0
 21
@s2
@ 2
=
1 +  0s0
 0
  1 +  1s1
 1
: (60)
This implies that (1 +  0s0) = 0 > (1 +  1s1) = 1 )  0 <  1:
Proof of Proposition 10. Let the initial period be denoted by t = 0. We have  0 < 1=:
If this were not true, then with constant taxes welfare could be improved by moving to
the lower tax (on the other side of the La¤er curve) that produces the same surplus.
Suppose that the coordinated marginal fall in the initial tax d 0 < 0 is nanced by a
sequence of future tax changes fd tg1t=1 such that dct = dc, t 2 Z++. Di¤erentiating (32)
and evaluating at the initial steady state yields that a strict increase in utility requires
dc0 + dc= (1  ) > 0: (61)
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Di¤erentiating (35) and evaluating at a steady state yields
1  

1X
t=0
td t  

s  R0b0
c

dc0   sdc
1   = 0: (62)
At a steady state, Rt = 1=. Thus evaluating (35) at the steady state yields s =
(1  ) b0= (c). Substituting this into (62) yields
(1  )
1X
t=0
td t + b0dc0=c  b0dc=c = 0: (63)
Di¤erentiating (34) and evaluating at the steady state yields
dR1 =  (dc  dc0) = (c) ; dRt = 0; t = 2; 3; ::: : (64)
Di¤erentiating (36), employing @ft=kt = Rt and dkt=dRt =  kt= (Rt), substituting
in (64) and evaluating at a steady state yields
d 0 =  (dc  dc0) k1= (c)  dc0
d 1 =   (dc  dc0) k1= (c)  dc (65)
d t =  dc; t = 2; 3; ::: :
Substituting (65) into (63) and using b0 > 0 yields that utility rises if and only if
1  


1   +
b0
c
> 0: (66)
This follows from  < 1=.
References
[1] Alesina, Alberto and Allan Drazen (1991), Why are Stabilizations Delayed?Amer-
ican Economic Review 81, 1170-88
32
[2] Alesina, Alberto and Guido Tabellini (1990), A Positive Theory of Budget Decits
and Government Debt,Review of Economic Studies 57, 403-14.
[3] Allers, Marten (1995), "Tax Compliance Costs in the Netherlands," in Cedric San-
ford, editor, Tax Compliance Costs: Measurement and Policy, Bath, UK, Fiscal
Publications, 173-195.
[4] Aragón, Fernando M., "The Flypaper E¤ect and Costly Tax Collection" London
School of Economics, 2010.
[5] Barro, Robert (1979), On the Determination of Public Debt,Journal of Political
Economy 87, 940-971.
[6] Bovenberg, A. Lans (1994), Capital Taxation in the World Economy,in F. van der
Ploeg, editor, Handbook of International Macroeconomics, Oxford, Blackwell,116-
150.
[7] Buiter, Willem (1987), "Fiscal Policy in Open Interdependent Economies," in A.
Razin and E. Sadka, eds., Economic Policy in Theory and Practice, London, Macmil-
lan, 101-144.
[8] Baldacci, Emanuele and Manmohan S. Kumar (2010), "Fiscal Decits, Public Debt
and Sovereign Bond Yields," International Monetary Fund working paper.
[9] Buiter, Willem (1989), Budgetary Policy, International and Intertemporal Trade in
the Global Economy, Amsterdam, North Holland.
[10] Buiter, Willem and Kenneth M. Kletzer (1991), "The Welfare Economics of Co-
operative and Non-cooperative Fiscal Policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control 15, 215-244.
[11] Bulow, Jeremy and Kenneth Rogo¤ (1989), "A Constant Recontracting Model of
Sovereign Debt," Journal of Political Economy 97, 155-178.
[12] Chamley, Christophe (1981), The Welfare Cost of Capital Income Taxation in a
Growing Economy,Journal of Political Economy 89, 468-96.
[13] Chamley, Christophe (1986), Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General Equi-
librium with Innite Lives, Econometrica 54, 607-22.
[14] Chang, Roberto (1990), "International Coordination of Fiscal Decits," Journal of
Monetary Economics 25, 347-366.
[15] Chang, Roberto (1997), "Financial Integration with and without International Policy
Coordination", International Economic Review 38, 547-564.
[16] Cole, Harold L. and Patrick J. Kehoe (1995), "The Role of Institutions in Reputation
Models of Sovereign Debt," Journal of Monetary Economics 35, 45-64.
[17] Drazen, Allan (2000), Political Economy in Macroeconomics, Princeton, Princeton
University Press.
33
[18] Eaton, Jonathan and Mark Gersovitz (1981), "Debt with Potential Repudiation,"
Review of Economic Studies 48, 289-309.
[19] Frenkel, Jacob A. and Assaf Razin (1985), Government Spending, Debt, and Inter-
national Economic Interdependence,Economic Journal 95, 619-636.
[20] Frankel, Jacob A. and Assaf Razin (1987), Fiscal Policies and the World Economy,
Cambridge, MIT Press.
[21] Guton, John L., OHare, John F., Stavrianos, Michael F. and Eric J. Toder (2003),
National Tax Journal 56, 673 - 688.
[22] Hamada, Koichi (1966), Strategic Aspects of Taxation on Foreign Investment In-
come,Quarterly Journal of Economics 80, 361-375.
[23] Hamada, Koichi (1986), Strategic Aspects of International Fiscal Interdependence,
Economic Studies Quarterly 37, 165-180.
[24] Kaplow, Louis (1990), "Optimal Taxation with Costly Enforcement and Evasion,"
Journal of Public Economics 43, 221-236.
[25] Kehoe, Patrick (1987), Coordination of Fiscal Policies in a World Economy,Jour-
nal of Monetary Economics 19, 349-376.
[26] Kehoe, Patrick (1989), Policy Cooperation Among Benevolent Governments May
be Undesirable," Review of Economic Studies 56, 289-296.
[27] Lucas, Robert E. (1988), On the Mechanisms of Economic Development,Journal
of Monetary Economics 22, 3-42.
[28] OECD (2009), Tax Administration in OECD and Selected Non-OECD Countries,
Paris.
[29] Persson, Torsten. and Lars E.O. Svensson (1989), Why a Stubborn Conservative
Would Run a Decit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences,Quarterly Journal
of Economics 104, 325-45.
[30] Pitt, Mark M. and Joel Slemrod (1989), American Economic Review 79, 1224-1232.
[31] Rogo¤, Kenneth and Anne Sibert (1988), Elections and Macroeconomic Policy
Cycles,Review of Economic Studies 55, 1-16.
[32] Sanford, Cedric, Goodwin, Michael and Peter Hardwick (1989), Administrative and
Compliance Costs of Taxation, Bath, UK, Fiscal Publications.
[33] Sinn, Hans Werner (1990), Tax Harmonization and Tax Competition in Europe,
European Economic Review 34, 489-504.
[34] Slemrod, Joel (1996), Which is the Simplest Tax System of Them All?in H. Aaron
and W. Gale, eds., Economic E¤ects of Fundamental Tax Reform. Washington, DC,
Brookings Institution, 355-391.
34
[35] Slemrod, Joel and Nikki Sorum (1984), "The Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual
Income Tax System," National Tax Journal 37, 461-74.
[36] Slemrod, Joel and Varsha Venkatesh (2002), "The Income Tax Compliance Cost of
Large and Mid-Size Businesses," Ross School of Business working paper, University
of Michigan, http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/39364.
[37] Tabellini, Guido (1990), Domestic Politics and the International Coordination of
Fiscal Policies, Journal of International Economics 28, 245-65.
[38] Turnovsky, Stephen J. (1988), The Gains from Fiscal Cooperation in the Two-
Commodity Real Trade Model,Journal of International Economics 25, 111-127.
[39] Turnovsky, Stephen J. (1997), International Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge,
MIT Press.
[40] Wilson, John D. (1989), "On the Optimal Tax Base for Commodity Taxation,"
American Economic Review 79, 1196-1206.
[41]
`
35
  
 
 
 
   
A
B
τ0 
τ1 
τ̂ 
τ̂ 
τ’ 
Figure 1 
